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Debate over the nature of temporary agency work has intensified in recent times, spurred on by a 
proposed European directive and by speculation about links with the much heralded ‘knowledge’ 
economy. This paper examines the debate, focusing on the current character of agency work in 
Britain. Using data from the Labour Force Survey, we assess some of the claims commonly made 
about agency work, relating to the personal and employment characteristics of those engaged in 
such work, the motives of agency workers and the prospects for those who take up agency jobs. In 
considering the arguments surrounding regulatory change, we find there is a strong case for 
regulation, but that this rests on the continued disadvantage associated with agency work, with little 
evidence of an impact from the purported ‘knowledge’ economy.  
  21.  Introduction.  
 
 
Recent proposals for a European directive covering the employment of temporary agency staff have 
sparked a flurry of interest in the nature and role of this form of work. These latest moves come 
some two decades since the European Commission first proposed measures to protect agency 
workers, however in the intervening period agency work has expanded markedly across most 
European countries. But just as numbers working through employment agencies have increased, so 
too has speculation about the causes and consequences of this growth. Initially conceived by some 
as part of a strategic attempt by firms to achieve cost and production flexibility in the face of what 
were seen as increasingly volatile product markets (Atkinson 1985) later interpretations painted a 
much bleaker picture, in which agency work was characterised as part of an emergent ‘risk society’ 
(Beck 1992; see also Allen and Henry 1996; Heery and Salmon 1999). Yet, if debates around the 
flexible firm became increasingly mired in conceptual and empirical confusion (see Kalleberg 2001 
for a recent review), these somewhat apocalyptic visions of the future of paid employment have 
fared little better. Commonplace in the early to mid 1990s, as the economy continued to expand 
these accounts had, by the end of the decade, given way to a rather different but increasingly 
influential vision: agency work was not only necessary, but empowering, in the new, ‘knowledge’ 
economy.  
 
Controversy surrounds the very notion of the ‘knowledge’ economy, with definitions varying 
widely between commentators (see Neumark and Reed 2004: 2-3). However, in general, proponents 
argue that advanced capitalist economies are undergoing a profound change due to a shift in the 
nature of competitive advantage, one that places a premium on ‘knowledge’ and intangible outputs 
and which is connected to the emergence of new information and communications technologies (see 
Nolan and Wood 2003 for a recent review). It is commonly argued that the growing emphasis on 
‘knowledge work’ implies a rapid growth in professional, managerial, scientific and technical 
occupations, and the corresponding demise of ‘old economy’ manual and service jobs (Leadbeater 
  32000). Others, however, have taken the argument further, suggesting that the ‘new economy’ also 
involves a fundamental shift in the organisation of work, with highly-skilled ‘experts’ increasingly 
choosing to sell their labour services to a series of clients and making more use of labour market 
intermediaries such as employment agencies (e.g. Knell 2000; Albert and Bradley 1997). 
Accordingly, from raising initial concerns about job quality and insecurity the expansion of agency 
work has come to be seen by some as a welcome (and inevitable) development. 
 
These latter arguments have proved powerful in informing debate about labour market regulation, 
albeit in different ways. Whilst the British government has tended to view any significant extension 
of employment rights as a potential fetter on the development of the new economy (see XXX), 
recent European Union directives covering fixed-term and agency employment have, in contrast, 
viewed regulation as playing a supporting role. To be sure, there remains a concern with job quality 
and hence that these workers are protected by a minimum floor of rights. Yet in the agency working 
directive in particular, these rights are now seen more as a means to an end, namely to underwrite 
the expansion of agency working in Europe, an expansion that is seen as the necessary concomitant 
of employment growth in the knowledge economy.  
 
However, in making these linkages, important claims about the nature of agency employment are 
involved. One of the paradoxes of the immense academic interest in this area is that remarkably 
little is known about agency work. In this paper, we focus on Britain and provide a careful 
examination of the current nature of agency employment. We assess some of the claims commonly 
made about agency employment, relating to: the characteristics of those engaged in such work; their 
motives; the supposed link between agency employment and the new, knowledge economy; and the 
prospects for those taking up agency jobs.  In doing so, our aim is to consider the extent to which 
there is evidence to support those arguing for and against regulation of the sector, and to identify 
  4those areas in which agency working reflects labour market flexibility and those in which it is a 
cause for concern.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explores the regulation of agency 
work in Britain, outlining the current ‘minimalist’ approach and setting against this the rationale 
behind the proposed directive on agency work. Section 3 considers theoretical expectations 
regarding the nature of agency work, from which we derive a number of hypotheses to guide our 
subsequent empirical investigation. Section 4 begins by examining the current nature of agency 
work in terms of both its composition and its quality. In terms of the latter, three aspects are 
highlighted: pay, willingness to undertake agency work and short-term prospects, investigated using 
new, longitudinal ‘linked’ Labour Force Survey datasets which provide some evidence on the extent 
to which agency work has provided a stepping-stone to more permanent forms of employment over 
the 1990s. Some conclusions are offered in Section 5. 
   
 
2. Regulating agency work: inconsistencies and innovations 
 
Even in the lightly regulated labour markets of Britain and the United States, agency workers enjoy 
fewer rights than their permanent counterparts. Indeed, some have pointed to the cost advantages 
this gives rise to in explaining the recent growth of the industry (Houseman et al. 2003; Peck and 
Theodore 2002). In many European states, agency workers form a separately identified category in 
legal terms, however, in Britain, minimal regulation of agency working follows from the fact that it 
has often fallen outside of the scope of employment legislation altogether. Indeed, only through the 
1973 Employment Agencies Act, which required the licensing of employment bureaux, and under 
the Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses Regulations, 2004, have agency workers 
been offered any protection
i.  Yet crucially, these legislative measures have done little to clarify the 
ambiguous employment status of agency workers generated by the ‘triangular’ nature of their 
  5employment relationship with agency and user firm. In practice, employment tribunals and courts 
have generally found agency workers’ rights in relation to both the client firm and the agency to be 
‘insubstantial’ (Deakin 2001).
ii Vulnerability and confusion in this area has been compounded by 
the differing definitions of employee status under employment law and tax regulations. Although 
treated as a dependent employee for tax purposes, agency workers have often been viewed 
simultaneously as self-employed for the purposes of employment regulation, and afforded scant 
protection as a result (Burchell et al. 1999; Hepple 1993).  
 
Recent moves to extend rights and protections to British workers have reinforced this pattern, with 
only patchy coverage emerging. While the very nature of agency jobs clearly creates scope for 
workers to ‘slip through the net’ (XXX), some commentators have argued that the Labour 
government has pursued a deliberately ‘minimalist’ approach to new regulations (XXX ; Smith and 
Morton 2001), to the disadvantage of sections of the workforce. To take one example, whilst the 
Working Time Directive included explicit provision to extend coverage to agency workers, the 
British government’s original decision to include a qualifying period of thirteen weeks’ continuous 
employment for the right to paid leave effectively excluded a large proportion of agency workers. 
Subsequently challenged by the broadcasting and entertainment union BECTU for discriminating 
against agency workers on short-term contracts, the government was obliged to remove the 
restriction following a ruling against it from the European Court (DTI 2001).   
 
In a similar vein, the provisions of the Employment Act 2002 relating to paternity, adoption and 
maternity rights and the right to request to work flexibly apply only to employees, again leading to 
uneven coverage of the regulations across the workforce (Trades Union Congress 2002). The upshot 
is that further space has been opened up by these new regulatory gaps for employers to realise 
labour cost savings, at least in the short term, by moving towards relatively less regulated 
employment arrangements. At the same time, an increasing differential in the coverage of labour 
  6market regulation clearly serves the interests of temporary employment agencies, providing an ideal 
foundation for an expansion of market share (Peck and Theodore 2002). 
 
The European dimension 
Against this, the European directive on temporary agency work heralds a serious regulatory shock 
to the sector in Britain. Proposed by the European Commission in March 2002, following the 
breakdown of negotiations between the social partners in May 2001, it represents the culmination of 
a lengthy process at the European level, the Commission first proposing a directive to protect 
agency workers in 1984 (European Commission 2002a: 8). Ultimately not adopted, this was 
followed in 1990 by proposals for three further directives on atypical employment to secure equal 
treatment with full-time workers with regard to working conditions, employment protection and 
health and safety. In the face of British government opposition, only the latter was adopted (Vosko 
1998: 20-1). However, extending protection to atypical workers remained a priority in the 
Commission, with negotiations between the social partners initiated again in 1995. Rather than 
attempt to tackle multiple forms of non-standard employment at the same time, as in 1990, the 
discussion focused on individual forms of employment in isolation, leading to framework 
agreements on part-time work (and Directive 1998/23/EC, transposed into British law in 2000) and 
fixed-term working (Directive 1999/70/EC, transposed into law in 2002), although not agency 
working as originally envisaged.  
 
Despite the failure of the social partners to reach agreement on the regulation of agency working, 
the European Commission identified sufficient common ground to issue a draft directive in this 
area, the final form of which must be agreed jointly by the European Council and Parliament 
(European Commission 2002a). In common with recent European directives on fixed-term and part-
time employment, a key aim is to prevent discrimination against workers on the basis of contractual 
form. However, due to the triangular nature of the agency worker’s employment relationship, this 
  7has proved a major hurdle in negotiations. The Commission originally proposed that the pay and 
conditions of agency workers be ‘no less favourable’ than comparable workers in the client firm, 
leading to disputes over the definition of a ‘comparable worker’
iii. Accordingly, the Commission 
amended its proposal such that the working and employment conditions of agency workers shall be 
‘at least those that would apply if they had been recruited directly by [the] enterprise to occupy the 
same job’ (European Commission 2002b: 11). Despite the principle of non-discrimination, the 
proposals contain a number of derogations, with the exclusion of assignments of less than six weeks 
from equal pay the most notable
iv. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, of equal significance to the content of the directive is the changing 
rhetoric used by the European Commission to justify their proposals. Moves to regulate non-
standard working in the early 1990s were framed in terms of the improvement of living and 
working conditions (under the Fundamental Charter on Social Rights) and the elimination of 
‘competitive distortions’ within the single European market (Vosko 1998: 20-1). To be sure, the 
agency working directive retains a general concern with improving job quality, and outlines specific 
criteria against which the ‘quality’ of agency jobs can be judged, including levels of pay, the 
willingness of individuals to undertake temporary work and the extent to which agency jobs lead to 
more stable and permanent employment relationships (European Commission 2002a: 5).  However, 
labour market flexibility is now placed firmly centre-stage, the contribution of flexible forms of 
work to the ‘employment intensiveness of growth’ highlighted alongside calls to ‘modernise’ work 
organisation (ibid: 1). Moreover, the directive on agency working argues that more flexible 
employment forms are required if Europe is to make a successful transition to a ‘knowledge-based 
economy’, a development underpinned by the target set at the Lisbon European Council meeting of 
2000 for Europe to become ‘the most competitive and most dynamic knowledge-based economy in 
the world’ (ibid: 1).  
 
  8Despite this repeated emphasis on the ‘knowledge economy’, finding a precise definition within EU 
publications is elusive. According to one recent report, the emergence of the knowledge economy 
follows technological change, with ‘….the introduction of new technologies lead(ing) to a rapid 
increase in the demand for skilled workers. This then demands a quantitative and, above all, a 
qualitative improvement of the labour supply’ (European Commission 2001: 29). Not only does the 
Commission see the transition to a knowledge-based economy involving job growth in high-skilled 
occupations (ibid: 33) but, within the agency working directive in particular, there is an expectation 
that temporary forms of employment will also expand as a result of these developments (and should 
be encouraged to do so). Yet the assumed linkages between agency working and the ‘knowledge 
economy’ are not spelt-out, beyond appeal to a vague notion that greater innovation has as its 
corollary a need for greater adaptability which temporary agency arrangements are seen to provide. 
What is clear, however, is that the Commission views the temporary agency work directive as an 
important contribution to the growth of the sector. The Commission argues that the new regulations 
will encourage more workers to seek jobs through employment agencies, whilst at the same time 
generating an expansion of the industry into new, high skill sectors (European Commission 2002a: 
10). Together with a requirement that member states remove many of the restrictions they may have 
on the establishment and operation of agencies, a broader range of workers willing to work through 
an agency is expected, in turn, to encourage a greater variety of user firms to hire such workers.
v
  
The British government has similarly invoked a link between the new, knowledge economy and 
flexible labour markets. But, in stark contrast to the European Commission, it has been used to 
justify a minimal extension of worker rights and protection for fear of jeopardising a nascent 
industrial revolution. While this stance has consolidated the uneven coverage of employment 
legislation, considerable doubt surrounds many of the claims of ‘new economy’ thesis, in particular 
its reliance on flexible forms of working. Indeed, high-tech industries have been found to be no 
more likely to use alternative employment relationships than others, whilst low-level service jobs 
  9have been growing in number (Freeman 2002 : 296-7; Goos and Manning 2003; XXX). Against 
this, the British government has reiterated its concern to retain a ‘balance between flexibility and 
protection’ (DTI 2002b: 3) in its response to the agency working directive,  with a strong 
implication that it believes the proposals err too much on the side of protection: ‘[the proposals] risk 
decreasing the attractiveness of agency workers to user companies, which might reduce the number 
of jobs available’ (ibid: 3). This stance led the government to challenge at the outset the legality of 
the Commission’s inclusion of pay under the principle of non-discrimination and, in discussions 
during 2003, argue that the directive’s exemption from the principle of equal treatment be extended 
from assignments of six weeks to those of one year (EFILWC 2003).
vi  
 
The proposals have also met with strong resistance from the agency industry on the basis that the 
requirement for comparability with workers in user enterprises would prevent agencies from 
determining the employment conditions of their own ‘employees’ (Confédération Internationale des 
Entreprises de Travail Temporaire (CIETT) 2003: 8; see also Jones 2002). Furthermore, industry 
bodies have argued that the directive would increase administrative costs and restrict the mobility of 
agency workers between assignments. However, a more likely basis for industry opposition is that 
in order to maintain the recent growth in agency working a considerable reduction in the margin 
between the wage paid to the worker and the fee levied on the client firm would be required under 
these regulations. The industry is unsurprisingly reticent on the size of the mark-up it levies on 
wage costs. Peck and Theodore (2002: 152-3) report a level of around 40 per cent in the US, 
however estimates for the Britain vary. Nursing agencies have been found to levy a 20 per cent 
commission on average (Audit Commission 2001).  Gray (2002) reports a mark-up of 15 to 25 per 
cent, depending on the degree of competition faced by the agency, whilst the DTI assumes a fee of 
one-third of wage costs in its regulatory impact assessment of the Commission’s proposals (DTI 
2002c).  
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employment rights to agency workers. Historically, British unions have adopted a hostile stance 
towards private agencies, with the TUC repeatedly calling for the progressive abolition of agencies 
in the 1960s and 1970s, on the grounds that they undermined collective bargaining and agreed terms 
and conditions (Heery 2004). This opposition to agencies was dropped in 1980, and since this time 
the TUC has campaigned for the improvement of agency workers’ conditions, underpinned by legal 
protection, a position clearly reflected in their recent review of agency work, which concludes: 
‘agencies are expanding and doing well in European labour markets where regulation is far more 
extensive and agency workers are often automatically covered by collective agreements. We can 
therefore see no convincing reason why UK agencies and UK employers cannot operate just as 
effectively with the directive as European agencies and European employers’ (TUC 2003: 15). 
Indeed, some British unions have already entered into agreements with the larger, multinational 
agencies (the Transport and General Workers Union’s involvement with Manpower stretching back 
to the late 1960s, for example), with the aim to improve terms and conditions for agency workers, 
as well as to prevent under-cutting of the permanent workforce. Yet in the absence of broader 
regulatory support, success in these rather isolated cases remains limited. Given that agencies 
compete mainly on price, union recognition has led largely to procedural, rather than substantive, 
concessions from the agencies, and correspondingly generated only low levels of union membership 
among agency workers (Heery 2004).  
 
Whilst proposed regulatory change has sparked an intense debate about the nature and role of 
agency working in Britain, to date it has been hampered by a lack of systematic analysis. As a 
result, competing claims have emerged regarding the character of agency working, the quality of 
agency jobs and the prospects for those engaged in this form of employment. For example, 
markedly different estimates have been generated of the proportions of agency workers in Britain in 
high-skilled occupations (Hotopp 2001; TUC 2003) and the extent to which agency work acts as a 
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(CBI) 2001: 2). Nor is there consensus on the impact of agency working on pay. The Recruitment 
and Employment Confederation (REC) reports that 60 per cent of agency temps earn as much or 
more than their permanent equivalents (REC 2002a: 1). In contrast, in its most recent regulatory 
impact assessment of the directive, the DTI reports ‘anecdotal’ evidence of agency workers earning 
more than comparable permanent workers (2002c: 28) but claims that, on average, agency pay is 
around 68 per cent of permanent employee pay (ibid: 32). Agency work is also commonly portrayed 
as meeting the demands of particular groups for flexible work, particularly women, youngsters and 
those with children (REC 2002b; see also CIETT 2002), and the largely voluntary nature of agency 
employment in Britain has been emphasised by the government (DTI 2002c: 3).However, such 
claims appear to be at odds with the TUC’s finding that the largest proportion of agency temps 
undertake this form of work as a ‘second choice’ to permanent work (TUC 2003: 5).  
 
Against all this, the question arises as to whether the various claims made in the debate over the 
agency working directive stand-up to scrutiny. While other forms of temporary working in Britain 
have been subjected to systematic analysis in recent years (see Booth et al. 2002), this is clearly 
lacking in the case of agency working. In the following sections we seek to undertake such an 
analysis, to build a clearer picture of agency working in Britain today and against which claims 
made in these debates, together with those emerging from growing case-study work, can be judged. 
Before proceeding to examine the characteristics of agency working in Britain in detail, it is 
instructive to examine theoretical expectations. This provides a framework for the subsequent 
analysis, allowing the identification of areas in which agency working may reflect labour market 




  123. Agency working in theory 
 
The theoretical literature on agency working remains relatively limited, however it is possible to 
identify a number of reasons why firms may use such arrangements. A common and longstanding 
interpretation is that agency workers provide a flexible buffer of workers that can be adjusted 
rapidly in the face of uncertain or fluctuating demand (Abraham, 1988; Atkinson, 1985). They may 
also be used to provide a replacement for workers on leave, or to provide cover whilst firms attempt 
to recruit permanent workers (Houseman et al. 2003: 107). It has also been suggested that agency 
workers may be used in place of probationary contracts, allowing firms to ‘try-out’ potential 
permanent recruits at little or no risk (ibid). Finally they may be used for short-term, ad hoc tasks 
without a permanent analogue. 
 
If these are some of the reasons commonly identified with the use of agency workers, what do they 
imply about the characteristics of agency workers, or the prospects they face in the labour market? 
Where agency jobs are used to cover leave or provide a buffer, standard economic theory predicts 
that voluntary sorting in the labour market will lead to a match between worker preferences and job 
characteristics. Due to their short or uncertain duration, agency assignments offer no firm-specific 
training, hence, it is argued, they will attract people who do not wish to undertake such investment 
opportunities, either because they remain undecided in their choice of career or the area in which 
they would prefer to live, or because of marginal attachment to the labour market (Booth et al., 
2002).
vii This line of reasoning leads to the expectation that young, single workers, women (due to 
their expected weaker labour market attachment) and older workers (due to the shorter period of 
return to any training investments) will be more likely to hold agency jobs. Given that outcomes are 
seen as matching preferences, on this view agency workers could be seen as ‘voluntary’ temps, 
however they are likely to receive lower wages due to differences in human capital.
viii
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hiring. Where firms are unsure of a worker’s productivity potential they will be wary of offering a 
permanent contract, the argument runs. While probationary contracts can be used to address this 
problem, it is suggested that agency arrangements may be favoured since they can reduce the costs 
to the firm of hiring ‘risky’ workers in two ways. Firstly, if agencies are more efficient at matching 
(and screening) workers, their use increases the probability that the worker will be taken on by the 
client firm. Secondly, hiring workers through an agency lowers recruitment and dismissal costs 
relative to direct-hire probation contracts, both important factors where the assignment may not lead 
to the offer of a permanent job (Booth et al. 2002). Autor (2001: 1445) comes to similar 
conclusions regarding the role of temporary employment agencies: ‘beyond providing flexible spot 
market labour, [agency] firms gather and sell information about worker quality to their clients’. 
Moreover, Autor goes on to suggest that the growing demand for agency workers in the United 
States and Europe implies that firms’ demand for worker screening is rising.  
 
Houseman et al. (2003) develop this line of reasoning, predicting that the use of agency workers for 
screening purposes will be strongly pro-cyclical. In an upswing, if firms need to raise wages to 
attract new recruits, wages will also need to be increased for incumbent workers. This, they argue, 
makes it more attractive for firms to hire lower wage, ‘risky’ workers with poor or no work 
histories, but who may be suitable for filling permanent vacancies, as labour markets tighten. If 
firms hire these workers directly, the introduction of a two-tier wage system may prove damaging to 
morale and productivity amongst the existing workforce. By using agencies, not only can firms 
benefit from recruiting, screening and matching advantages, new workers can be paid at lower rates 
without upsetting internal wage structures, it is argued. If this rationale is accepted, agencies’ role in 
screening potential permanent recruits will have become increasingly important during the 1990s as 
the British labour market tightened, leading in turn, to the expectation that a greater proportion of 
agency temps are making the transition to permanent jobs.  
  14 
However, an opposing perspective is provided by segmented labour market theory. Although a 
similar association between disadvantaged labour market groups and agency working is predicted, 
the mechanism underpinning it is rather different. As labour markets tighten, employers move down 
the queue for jobs in internal labour markets. Rather than admit disadvantaged workers placed low 
down the queue to permanent positions, firms will increase their use of employment agencies, thus 
shifting many expanding employment opportunities to the secondary sector. On this view, the 
increased use of agencies during the last decade represents a conscious move to exclude certain 
workers from permanent positions, rather than use agency assignments as a form of probationary 
contract (Doeringer and Piore 1971: 169; see also Amuedo-Dorantes 2000). 
 
Reflecting this line of reasoning, there is growing evidence that firms have been reducing the scope 
of their internal labour markets and shifting jobs to the secondary sector in recent years (Grimshaw 
et al. 2001). In many instances this has entailed the sub-contracting of entire operations to agencies 
(Purcell and Purcell 1999) and/or the functional separation of tasks carried out by agency workers 
and other employees (Ward et al. 2001). In either case, the outcome is reduced scope for 
progression into and through the client organisation. This is illustrated starkly by one of the 
workplaces studied by Grimshaw et al. (2001: 33) where a reported ratio of nine agency staff to 
every permanent worker highlights the fact that for many temps opportunities for internal 
progression within the client firm are close to zero. Compounding matters, the functional separation 
of the tasks carried out by agency and permanent workers limits any opportunities still further, since 
any skills acquired by agency workers will be quite distinct from those required in other jobs in the 
organisation (Purcell and Purcell 1999: 176).  Taken together, while these developments permit user 
firms to reduce future wage liabilities and associated management costs by shifting employment 
responsibilities - a factor the marketing strategies of agencies have been increasingly keen to 
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have been accompanied by an increase in the rate of transition to more permanent work. 
 
In contrast to these linkages with disadvantaged workers, some recent accounts have, in common 
with the European Commission, connected the rise of the ‘knowledge’ economy with agency 
working. Alongside a predicted increase in the numbers employed in high skill professional, 
managerial, scientific and technical occupations, these visions connect the changing nature of 
competitive advantage with a fundamental shift in the organisation of work (Albert and Bradley 
1997; Knell 2000; see also DTI 1999). Specifically, it is argued that the enhanced market position 
enjoyed by skilled ‘knowledge’ workers will place them in a position to demand greater control 
over their work, both in terms of its execution and in terms of its timing. To the extent that 
organisations are unwilling, or unable, to satisfy their demands, knowledge workers will 
increasingly turn to atypical contracting arrangements, the story runs.
ix Importantly, this is taken to 
include temporary contract working and the use of employment agencies. Indeed, Albert and 
Bradley point to the considerable informational problems that arise both for workers and firms in a 
temporary contract labour market as a central element of their argument. Accordingly, temporary 
employment agencies are seen as playing an important role in matching ‘expert’ knowledge 
workers with a series of short-term appointments. Far-reaching in its effects, this is a trend said to 
be readily apparent: ‘[t]he increasing use of agencies by knowledge workers is already impacting in 
some areas of the economy. In the future this is likely to be a significant trend which will influence 
organisations, wealth creation and employment’ (Albert and Bradley 1997: 6).
x
 
A number of hypotheses can be drawn from this discussion of theoretical perspectives. Firstly, 
standard labour market theory, the screening model and the segmented labour market view would 
all predict that labour market entrants, young workers and women are more likely to be found in 
agency jobs, alongside older workers. In the case of the latter group, the screening model would 
  16link this with greater uncertainty about the productivity potential of displaced workers with 
potentially outdated skills, the human capital model to a shorter time horizon in which to recoup 
investment in firm-specific skill and segmented labour market theory to the dynamics of internal 
labour markets. Secondly, proponents of the ‘knowledge economy’ thesis have pointed to the 
growing attractiveness of agencies to highly skilled workers or ‘experts’. Whilst recognising that in 
many accounts only ‘frustratingly vague’ definitions are given of the types of jobs involved 
(Neumark and Reed 2004: 4), a theme common to many is the concentration of knowledge work 
within professional, managerial and technical occupations (e.g. Albert and Bradley 1997). This 
leads to the second hypothesis, namely that agency working is becoming increasingly important 
within these high-skilled occupations. Thirdly, standard theory predicts that agency employees will 
receive lower wages than other workers, but that this is due to differences in human capital. 
Fourthly, the same theory would anticipate the ‘voluntary sorting’ of workers into temporary 
agency jobs, with the implication that agency workers prefer these arrangements over other forms 
of work. Against this, the screening and segmented labour market models suggest that agency 
arrangements reflect the preferences of user firms rather than workers.  Fifth, and finally, we 
explore the prospects for those in agency employment, to test the competing hypotheses emerging 
from the theoretical literature. If, as Autor (2001) and Houseman et al. (2003) suggest, the growth 
in agency working reflects a changing method of worker screening, we would expect a greater 
proportion of agency workers to make the transition from agency jobs to permanent employment, 
particularly as labour markets tightened during the 1990s. Set against this, and drawing on 
segmented labour market theory and case-study evidence, an alternative possibility is that the 
diminishing scope of internal labour markets coupled with the increased outsourcing of whole 
operations to employment agencies have combined to reduce short term opportunities for movement 
from agency work to permanent employment.  
 
4. Exploring the nature of agency work 
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To investigate these issues, we use the Labour Force Survey (LFS), a nationally representative 
survey administered on a quarterly basis to a sample of around 60,000 households in the UK. 
Recent studies of temporary work in the UK have utilised the British Household Panel Survey, 
concentrating only on the characteristics of casual/seasonal and fixed-term contract employment 
(see Booth et al. 2002). The LFS allows for the identification of a wider range of temporary 
arrangements, including agency working
xi. Table 1 puts the recent growth in agency working in 
context, highlighting rapid expansion of the sector since the early 1990s.
xii By 2000 the number of 
agency workers had increased threefold, such that the sector came to account for 1 per cent of total 
employment. This increase is reflected in agency work’s increasing share of all temporary jobs over 
the decade, growth which has come largely at the expense of ‘other’ types of temporary work 
(mainly seasonal and casual). By contrast, expansion of fixed-term working has largely matched 
overall growth in temporary working to maintain its share as the dominant form of temporary 
employment.  
  18 
 
 
Table 1: Temporary and permanent employment in Britain, 1992 and 2000 
 
  1992   2000 





of total  
employment 
































1,146,300 100  5.5    1,553,100  100  6.7 
Permanent 
employees  19,558,800 -  94.5   21,665,600  -  93.3 
 




Characteristics of the agency workforce 
What are the principal characteristics of the agency workforce, and how do these differ from other 
forms of temporary work, or indeed permanent jobs? How do the relate to theoretical expectations? 
Using the Spring 2000 LFS we find that just over half (51 per cent) of agency workers are male 
while a lower proportion of agency workers are married, or have a dependent child, relative to other 
groups (see appendix 1). In contrast to the view that working students are a driver of the growth in 
agency work, we find that less than seven per cent are in full-time education, a lower proportion 
  19than in fixed-term (8 per cent) or other temporary jobs (32 per cent), although close to two-thirds 
are under 35 years old.  
 
Providing some support for the argument that agency jobs provide an important route into work, 
over one-quarter of agency workers are recent labour market entrants, yet this proportion is close to 
that amongst fixed-term contract workers (23 per cent) and falls far short in comparison with other 
temporary workers (40 per cent), suggesting that agency work is not unique in this regard. Despite 
rapid growth during the 1990s, agency work remains concentrated in London and the south-east, 
reflecting long-established patterns (Casey 1988).  
 
In terms of occupation, agency workers are over-represented in clerical and secretarial and routine 
operative jobs, these two areas accounting for almost two-thirds of agency employment. The 
dominance of these occupations is apparent from closer scrutiny of the occupational composition of 
agency work. At the two-digit level, the six largest occupational groupings of agency workers in 
Spring 2000, together accounting for 40 per cent of agency employment were: clerks (25,000), 
secretarial staff (20,000); other routine operatives (16,000); numerical clerks (15,000); despatch 
workers (14,000); and data entry clerks (13,000). Furthermore, at the two-digit level, absolute 
agency employment growth in the period 1992-2000 has been greatest in clerical and secretarial and 
routine operative occupations, the three fastest growing areas being general clerks, other routine 
operatives (mainly packers), and stores despatch workers (mainly warehouse assistants).
xiii By 
contrast, higher skill ‘knowledge work’ occupations (managers, scientists, engineers, designers, 
consultants, IT workers, technicians etc.) are notable only by their very low numbers (all much less 
than 10,000, the threshold of statistical reliability in the quarterly LFS).  
 
Finally, tenure levels for agency temps are relatively short when compared to permanent 
employment.  In addition, a relatively high proportion of agency temps are to be found in the 
  20shortest tenure category of less than three months. It is notable, however, that a significant 
proportion of agency workers (around one quarter) are also found to have tenure of more than a 
year, perhaps reflecting an increasing provision of long-term staffing by agency firms (Druker and 
Stanworth 2001; Purcell and Purcell 1999).  
 
In table 2 we undertake a more systematic, multivariate analysis of the factors associated with 
agency work. Here we perform a multinomial logit regression to model the probability of being in a 
range of employment states, including agency work, as a function of a range of personal and job 
characteristics. This allows us to identify those factors that have an independent effect on the 
likelihood of agency work and to gauge their impact relative to that on other employment states. We 
report relative risk ratios, which indicate the effect of a given variable on the the likelihood of being 
in agency work, fixed-term contract work or other temporary work relative to being a permanent 
employee.  
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Table 2:  Relative risk ratios of being in different temporary employment 
states relative to permanent employment, multinomial logit, Spring 2000 
 
  Employment state 
  Agency   Fixed-term 
contract 
Other temporary 
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No qualification (ref)      






      






(Table 2 continues overleaf) 
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 Agency  Fixed-term 
contract 
Other temporary 
      



























































































Sales (ref)      


























      
N=47978 
Wald Chisq=4847.97 
Pseudo R2 = 0.175 
    
Notes: Further controls are included for part-time work, public sector, industry (12 dummies) and region (10 dummies). 
**Statistically significant at the 0.01 per cent level, * statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
Source: LFS Spring 2000, weighted data.  
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How do these results compare to the first hypothesis set out in section 3? Contrary to expectations, 
we find that women are no more likely than men to be working in agency jobs, although this is to be 
contrasted with fixed-term and other temporary work, where women are less likely to be found than 
men. We do find support for the hypothesis that agency work is associated with younger workers, 
with 16-24 year-olds twice as likely to be found in agency work compared to the base category of 
employees aged 35-44. However, this is also the case for other forms of temporary work and we 
find no support for the hypothesis that older workers face a higher probability of agency work. 
Indeed, in this regard, age has an impact only on the likelihood of being in other forms of temporary 
work, where the risk increases by 46 per cent for workers over 55.  
 
Again, confounding theoretical expectations and claims made in debate, neither marriage nor the 
presence of children significantly increase the likelihood of being in agency work relative to 
permanent employment. Interacting these variables with gender reveals no additional effects. Nor is 
the likelihood of being in agency work significantly higher for those in full-time education, after 
controlling for personal and job characteristics, as might be expected. Rather, full-time students are 
much more likely to be found in fixed-term or other forms of temporary work (the odds being twice 
as large for those in full-time education in both cases). 
 
Factors that are associated with an increased likelihood of agency work relate to education and 
labour market experience. Compared to the reference category of ‘no qualification’, workers with 
higher qualifications generally show an increased likelihood of being in agency work, perhaps 
reflecting the take-up of agency employment as an entry job on completion of full-time education. 
Confirming the view that agency work is important for labour market entrants, those out of work in 
the previous year are three times more likely to be in agency work than those who were in a job. 
But agency work is by no means unique in this regard, prior joblessness impacting on the 
  24probability of fixed-term and other temporary job status by the same magnitude. In this regard, 




Turning to job characteristics, we are able to examine purported linkages between knowledge work 
and agency jobs. Here we highlight some of the particular occupations linked with the ‘knowledge 
economy’, together with those more traditionally associated with the agency sector (cf. appendix 1). 
To be sure, some professional and associate professional occupations are associated with an 
increased probability of agency work. Teachers are three and a half times as likely, and welfare 
associate professionals (nurses, therapists, welfare workers) three times as likely to be in agency 
work compared to the base group of sales workers. Recent studies have highlighted the increasing 
importance of agency labour in these public sector dominated occupations (see, for example, 
Grimshaw 2003), with growing recourse to such arrangements often driven by the prospect of 
higher pay in shortage areas (Heery 2004), although the number of agency staff in these areas 
remain small  (<10,000 in each occupation). While at one level these could be said to be 
‘knowledge workers’, accounts of the new economy are apt to stress other groups such as engineers 
and natural scientists (an occupational grouping containing software engineers). These workers are 
actually significantly less likely to be working through an agency (and are very small in number). 
Rather, table 2 indicates that fixed-term work is more commonly found among this occupational 
group.  
 
Further doubt is cast on a straightforward link between knowledge-based occupations and agency 
employment when considering managerial or other professional (accountants, architects, doctors, 
lawyers) and associate professional occupations (designers, underwriters, computer analysts). 
Employment in these occupations reduces the likelihood of agency work in relation to permanent 
employment or has no significant impact, respectively. Again, professionals and associate 
  25professionals are found to have an increased likelihood of fixed-term contract work, a result in line 
with some of the findings of Booth et al. (2002: 9). 
 
Most strikingly, the probability of agency employment relative to permanent employment is 
significantly higher, and the effects large, for clerical and secretarial workers and plant and 
machinery operatives, occupations in which temporary agency working has been of long-standing 
significance (see for example, Cmnd 1968).  Secretarial staff and other routine operatives, for 
example, are over six-times and nine-times more likely, respectively, to be working through an 
agency compared to the base group. Similarly, agency employment is significantly more likely 
amongst key personal and protective workers in the health sector (assistant nurses and care 
assistants), again,  public sector dominated occupations.These results cast doubt on a 
straightforward link between the new, knowledge economy and temporary agency work.  Rather, 
they point to continuing linkages between relatively low-skilled work and agency status, and the 
enduring significance of parts of the public sector as a major force shaping patterns of agency 
labour.  
 
If this suggests little change in the traditional structure of agency working, what of the nature of 
agency jobs? Specifically, how do agency jobs in Britain fare when job quality is considered? As 
noted earlier, the European Commission (2002a) has identified levels of pay, the willingness of 
individuals to undertake temporary work and the extent to which agency jobs lead to more stable 
and permanent employment relationships as important aspects of job quality, amongst others. It is 
to these features that discussion now turns. 
 
What is an  agency job worth?   
To examine levels of pay associated with agency work, we pool observations from a number of 
consecutive quarterly LFS datasets, from Spring-Winter 2000
xv. The raw figures from this dataset 
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(Spring 2000 prices) for agency workers, compared to £8.81 per hour for permanent workers, a 
wage gap of 22 per cent . Stark differences in pay can also be observed between men and women – 
male agency temps earn, on average £6.48 (36 per cent below the average hourly wage for male 
permanent workers) whilst female agency workers earn an average of  £7.21 (4 per cent below the 
average wage for female permanent workers). In this regard, agency jobs are similar to ‘other’ 
temporary jobs, which also show a (larger) negative wage gap for both male and female workers, 
results in line with the findings of Booth et al. (2002: 194). By contrast, fixed-term contract jobs in 
our sample pay more, on average, than permanent jobs. 
 
Table 3: Agency workers and wages, 2000 
 
  Average hourly wage (£)    OLS regression 








        






































N   59317  29349  29968    59317  29349  29968 
 
Notes: The left hand side of the table reports average hourly wages (deflated to Spring 2000 prices using the 
quarterly RPI, all items) for workers in permanent and temporary jobs. The right-hand side of the table 
reports results of OLS regressions with the dependent variable being the natural log of hourly wages, 
deflated by the quarterly RPI (all items) against a base of Spring 2000. The reported numbers are the co-
efficients for the three types of temporary work.  Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Additional 
variables included in the regressions are : gender, age, age squared level of qualification (6 dummies), full-
time education, part-time, tenure, tenure squared, whether made redundant in the last three months, whether 
received training in last 3 months, quarterly dummies, regional unemployment, firm size (4 dummies), 
occupation (9 dummies), industry (12 dummies), region (10 dummies) and a constant. A selectivity 
correction for non-participation in the labour market is included in the regression of women’s pay, estimated 
using a Heckman model. 
**Statistically significant at the 0.01 per cent level, * statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Although the raw figures suggest that agency jobs are of poor quality in terms of pay, much of this 
difference may be accounted for by variation in the composition of agency and permanent jobs with 
respect to occupation, age, skill, experience and other factors related to wage outcomes. To what 
extent is this the case? To investigate this issue we estimate a standard wage regression and 
examine the effect of being in one of the three kinds of temporary job on the natural log of real 
(Spring 2000 prices) hourly wages, whilst controlling for a range of personal and job 
characteristics.The results, reported on the right-hand side of Table 3, show that the wage gaps are 
reduced when these characteristics are taken into account, although they remain relatively large and 
significant for agency workers. As before, we also look for different effects by gender and include a 
selectivity correction for non-participation in the labour market in the regressions of women’s pay. 
Here we find an 11 per cent hourly wage penalty for male agency workers, and a 6 per cent penalty 
for women in comparison with permanent workers. How do these penalties compare with other 
temporary jobs? Interestingly, while the raw wage gap is larger for ‘other’ temporary workers than 
for agency workers, once we control for personal and job characteristics, the wage gap is larger for 
agency workers (9 per cent versus 7 per cent). However, this masks greater differences by gender, 
with the penalty to agency working being particularly large relative to that in ‘other’ forms of 
temporary work for men but not women. In contrast to Booth et al.’s (2002) findings from the 
BHPS, our LFS sample indicates no significant difference between hourly wages for male or female 
fixed-term contract workers and permanent employees once other factors are taken into account. 
However, by using a different dataset we have been able to show that significant wage gaps exist 
for agency workers in the UK. This suggests, counter to our third hypothesis, that the lower wages 
received by agency workers are not totally attributable to differential investments in human capital, 
as certain theoretical positions suggest. Rather, by this measure, agency jobs are, on average, of 
poorer quality than permanent jobs.  
 
Choice or constraint? 
  28From the discussion in section 3 above, if agency working reflects the outcome of a voluntary 
sorting process in the labour market, there should be a close match between employment status and 
worker preferences for this form of employment. Similarly, the extent to which workers take on 
these jobs willingly can be seen as a measure of the quality of agency jobs. To examine these issues, 
we utilise information from the LFS. Respondents who state that their job is temporary are asked a 
supplementary question about their reasons for undertaking this form of work, allowing us to gauge 
whether agency workers actively choose these jobs. Looking first at the raw responses over the 
1990s, there is little support for the fourth hypothesis, that agency jobs match the preferences of the 
majority of workers.  During the fastest period of growth in agency working (1994-6), almost two-
thirds of agency workers reported that they were undertaking agency work due to a lack of 
alternative employment opportunities (XXX). By 2000, when labour markets had tightened 
considerably following a prolonged period of economic expansion, the proportion of ‘involuntary’ 
agency temps remained high, at some 50 per cent, compared to 30 per cent stating that they had 
taken an agency job because they did not want a permanent job
xvi. This would seem to cast doubt on 
the generality of the argument that agency working meets ‘a genuine demand for flexible work from 
workers’ put forward by the industry (CIETT, 2002: 4; see also REC, 2002b).  
 
However, these figures present the overall results. Preferences are likely to vary among different 
groups of agency workers, according to personal characteristics. It has been suggested by some that 
the growth of agency working in the US has been driven by the preferences of certain sections of 
the labour market, particularly women returning to work (Morris and Vekker, 2001; although see 
Golden and Appelbaum, 1992). Similarly, advocates of the ‘new economy’ thesis would predict that 
knowledge workers would be more likely to exhibit a preference for agency work (see Guest 2004, 
for a review). To examine these issues, we again use the pooled 2000 LFS dataset to estimate a 
simple probit model to examine the factors associated with being in agency work on a voluntary 
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characteristics (Table 4). 
Table 4: Factors influencing the likelihood of stating a preference for agency work relative to 




   
Female  0.056 
(0.093) 
Age  0.015 
(0.020) 
Age squared  -0.000 
(0.000) 
Child under 5  -0.212 
(0.210) 
Child 5-18  -0.243 
(0.168) 
Married  -0.100 
(0.118) 
Female*child under 5  0.206 
(0.174) 
Female*child 5-18  0.174 
(0.194) 
Female* married  0.291* 
(0.143) 
Degree  0.508** 
(0.150) 




A level  0.491** 
(0.141) 
GCSE  0.188 
(0.141) 
Other  0.169 
(0.148) 
No qualification (ref)   
  
In full-time education  1.061** 
(0.138) 
Part-time  0.313** 
(0.081) 
Tenure  0.016** 
(0.003) 
Tenure squared  -0.000** 
(0.000) 
Managerial  -0.228 
(0.212) 
Professional  0.100 
(0.224) 
Engineering/natural scientist  -0.742 
(0.429) 
Teaching professional  -0.162 
(0.248) 
Associate professional  -0.137 
(0.212) 
Welfare   0.059 
(0.313) 
(continued overleaf) 
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Clerical  -0.470** 
(0.150) 
Numerical clerk  -0.471* 
(0.191) 
NES clerk  -0.150 
(0.149) 
Secretarial  -0.071 
(0.159) 
Telephonists  -0.278 
(0.185) 
Craft  -0.387 
(0.224) 












Sales (ref)   




Assemblers  -0.585* 
(0.243) 
Other routine operatives  -0.714** 
(0.201) 
Other occupations  -0.181 
(0.298) 
N=2176 
Wald Chisq (54)=445.12 
Pseudo R2=0.184 
 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from probit analysis modelling likelihood of being voluntarily in agency work relative 
to involuntary/other reasons. Robust standard errors in brackets.  
Further controls are included for public sector, training in last 3 months, regional unemployment, industry (12 
dummies) and region (10 dummies). 
**Statistically significant at the 0.01 per cent level, * statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
Source: Pooled data from 4 quarters of 2000 LFS, unweighted  
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The results reveal that the likelihood of choosing agency work is not significantly affected by 
gender. Neither age, nor the presence of a child (under 5, or between 5 and 18) significantly raise 
the likelihood of undertaking agency work on a voluntary basis, and interactions between gender 
and the presence of a dependent child are also insignificant. However, we find that higher 
qualifications (A-Level and above) are generally associated with an increased likelihood of 
undertaking agency work on a voluntary basis and those in full-time education exhibit a 
significantly higher likelihood of choosing agency work, reflecting the increasing propensity of full-
time students to combine paid work with study. Yet, as noted above, the proportion of student 
agency workers remains relatively small. Those in part-time agency jobs are also more likely to 
state that they have chosen such work, perhaps reflecting a marginal attachment to the labour 
market, whilst the likelihood of voluntary agency working increases with tenure (at a decreasing 
rate). However, as noted earlier, for most agency workers assignments remain of short duration (see 
appendix 1).  
 
Next, we turn to differences by skill and occupation, highlighting some of the occupations linked 
with the knowledge economy and those traditionally associated with agency employment. None of 
the ‘knowledge-based’ managerial, professional or associate professional occupations are found to 
be associated with a significantly higher probability voluntary agency working. Importantly, clerical 
staff and numerical clerks are significantly less likely to state a voluntary preference for agency 
work, as are plant and machinery operatives, assemblers and other routine operatives. These are 
occupational areas where a large proportion of the overall agency workforce is to be found. Overall, 
how do these results relate to hypothesis 4?  There is little support for the notion that agency work 
matches the preferences of a majority of those engaged in form of work. Nor is it the case that 
‘voluntary’ agency working is more likely amongst highly skilled workers, the young, women, or 
those with children. Overall, then, there is little support for hypothesis 4.  
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Short-term transitions and prospects 
Whether agency employment constitutes a bridge into more stable employment, or a trap that 
churns workers between short spells of work and unemployment is an important aspect of job 
quality and a feature that has come under increasing scrutiny in many countries, but little regard has 
been paid to the degree to which prospects have altered over time. If, as discussed in section 3 
above, the growth in agency working over the 1990s reflects an increased desire by firms to screen 
workers using temporary agency contracts, then this change in rationale implies that the proportion 
of workers graduating to more permanent positions will have correspondingly risen. Alternatively, 
the diminishing scope of internal labour markets together with a greater use of agency workers to 
staff out-sourced operations suggests we should expect no great change in transition probabilities 
between the early and late 1990s. To investigate these issues, and examine our fifth set of 
hypotheses we make use of the panel element of the LFS. With households remaining in the survey 
for five consecutive quarters, between any two quarters there is an 80 percent overlap of 
respondents. This potentially allows for one-fifth of individuals to be tracked over a year, and 
permits the identification of a worker’s employment status in their original survey quarter and the 
final quarter, one year later. In our analysis we utilise LFS five-quarter matched datasets originating 
in Spring each year over the period 1993-2000. Following Alba-Ramírez (1998), we pool 
observations of individuals who are in agency employment in the origin quarter each year, giving us 
a total sample of 345 agency workers. We then consider the labour market status of these workers 
one year later, which takes one of four forms: permanent employment (including self-employment), 
temporary employment, unemployment or inactivity (out of the labour force).  
 
In terms of the overall patterns, almost half of our pooled sample of agency workers make the 
transition to permanent employment over the course of a year (48 per cent), a figure slightly lower 
than Segal and Sullivan (1997) report for the US. However, some 38 per cent are observed still in 
  33temporary work one year later, whilst 7 per cent move into unemployment and a further 7 per cent 
leave the labour force altogether. This indicates that many agency workers do not succeed in 
making the transition to more stable employment, at least within the space of a year. But what 
factors influence whether a worker makes a successful transition and have the chances of doing so 
altered as the British labour market strengthened in the 1990s? 
 
To investigate these issues we estimate a multinomial logit model of the probability of a transition 
from agency work into one of the four outcome states noted above as a function of a range of 
personal and employment characteristics, relative to the base category of continuing temporary 
employment. This allows us to identify which of those factors are associated with moves out of 
agency work.  
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Table 5:  Relative risk ratios of transitions from agency work, multinomial logit 1993-2000 
 
  Status one year later 





        
























































No qualification (ref)      


































Tenure0-3 months (ref)      


















(Table 5 continues overleaf)



























Service occupation  











    
Note: Table shows risk ratios of transitions one year later to a given employment state relative to temporary 
employment for workers who were employed in agency work in the origin quarter. Standard error of relative risk ratio 
is in brackets.  
Further controls are included for industry (4 dummies) and region (5 dummies). 
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 per cent level, ** statistically significant at the 0.05 level, * statistically 
significant at the 0.1 level 
Source: Pooled data from 5-quarter linked datasets, LFS 1993-2000, unweighted data 
 
 
In terms of transitions to permanent work, results in Table 5 show that age reduces the likelihood of 
a move (with the likelihood falling at an increasing rate). The presence of a dependent child is 
associated with an increased likelihood of moving into permanent employment, rather than 
remaining temporary, perhaps lending some support to the notion that agencies may be used as a 
‘stepping stone’ to permanent work for those returning to the labour market. However, interactions 
(not reported) between gender and the presence of a child, or children and labour market entry were 
found to have no significant impact on the likelihood of a move into stable work.
xvii Those 
combining education with agency work are twenty-four times more likely to be observed out of the 
labour market one year later, reflecting the marginal labour market attachment of these workers. 
However, greater levels of education are not found to increase significantly the probability of a 
move to permanent work, although those with higher qualifications are generally less likely to move 
into unemployment (see also Alba-Ramírez, 1998). Yet those with qualifications below degree level 
(e.g. teaching and nursing qualifications) and those with ‘other’ qualifications (mainly GCSEs 
below grade C, NVQ Level 1 or unspecified qualifications, likely to be employer based) are found 
  36less likely to leave agency work for a permanent job. This may be because these qualifications are 
not generally valued by employers (Grugulis  2003) or are associated with certain professions where 
agency workers are used to fill labour shortages on an on-going basis.  
 
Contrary to what might be expected, agency workers who were searching for another job are not 
significantly more likely to have made the transition to permanent employment one year later. 
Rather, job search increases the odds of becoming unemployed, rather than remaining in temporary 
work, by more than a factor of four. What of the argument that agencies provide an important route 
back into the labour market? Those out of work a year before taking an agency job are no more 
likely to move to permanent work as to remain in a temporary job, but they are more than nine 
times as likely to be unemployed one year later. This suggests that it takes some considerable time 
before the experience of agency work may help labour market (re)entrants secure more stable 
employment. It is also a finding consistent with the argument that agency assignments are 
increasingly being used to supplant probationary contracts, in trying out ‘risky’ workers. Yet, if the 
screening rationale for agency working has become increasingly important, is there any evidence 
that assignments have become more likely to lead to permanent positions during the 1990s, 
everything else equal? To test this we include a dummy variable, splitting the period into two 
according to the rate of growth in employee employment: 1992-1995  (average employee growth of 
–0.3 per cent per annum) and 1996-2000 (2.0 per cent per annum).
xviii Our results show that, 
although the likelihood of moving from agency to permanent employment was higher between 1996 
and 2000, the difference is not statistically significant. This is contrary to expectations generated by 
the screening argument. Rather, these results are more in line with the hypothesis that the growing 
number of agency jobs in Britain are associated with the increased outsourcing of discrete 
operations to employment agencies alongside a narrowing of internal labour markets, developments 
which imply that agency work will continue to provide limited opportunities for direct movement 
into more stable work Taken together, these results give cause for concern, following the rise in 
  37agency working over the 1990s, and the expectation within the EU directive that agency jobs lead to 
more stable employment relationships. The evidence is that agency jobs remain precarious. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Intense debate has been generated by the proposed directive on agency work, which assumes a link 
between agency employment and a new, knowledge economy, and which sees the expansion of this 
form of work as a means of improving employment rates across Europe. The analysis presented 
here allows many of the claims made in this debate to be subjected to empirical scrutiny, with the 
evidence painting a rather pessimistic picture of the current state of agency work in Britain.  There 
is little evidence of an association between those areas typically characterised as ‘knowledge 
occupations’ – such as engineers, natural scientists and software specialists - and agency work. 
Rather the figures point to the enduring significance of parts of the public sector in determining 
patterns of agency labour, and the continued linkages between low skilled work and agency status. 
Within the public sector cutbacks and uncertainties in budgets, alongside a relative decline of public 
sector pay and the resultant shortages in skilled areas such as nursing and teaching has led to an 
increasing reliance on costly agency staff (see e.g. Audit Commission 2001). Given strong demand, 
agencies can afford to pay higher wages for these staff while retaining a healthy mark-up, which in 
turn may lead to further shortages amongst permanent staff as they are lured away by the prospect 
of higher earnings. Yet numbers of agency staff in these areas remain relatively small. The vast 
majority of agency workers continue to be employed in low-level clerical and routine operative 
occupations, with jobs in these areas driving the expansion of agency work in the 1990s.  
 
When we turn to look at the quality of agency jobs, using three of the measures proposed by the EU 
for measuring agency job quality – pay, the extent to which workers choose this form of work, and 
the likelihood of making a transition to permanent work, – there are reasons to question the 
assumed link between an expansion of agency work and improvements in job quality. Agency jobs, 
  38on average, are paid less than permanent jobs, and some differential between these jobs remains 
after controlling for a range of personal and employment characteristics that might affect wage 
levels. It would appear, by this measure, that the quality of agency jobs is intrinsically lower than 
permanent employment. The largely voluntary nature of agency working is assumed both within the 
directive, and by those opposing the need for regulation, yet very limited support is found here to 
back such claims. A minority of agency workers overall state a preference for agency work, nor is 
there an increased likelihood of voluntarily choosing agency work amongst females, those with 
children or those in the majority of high-skilled occupations. Finally, only limited support is found 
for the notion that agencies may be used as a stepping-stone to permanent employment for key 
groups in the labour market (such as those returning to the labour market), while the likelihood of 
moving from agency work to permanent employment has not significantly altered over the 1990s, 
despite a number of years of employment growth.  
 
The analysis here presents a compelling case for regulation of the agency industry, but rather than 
resting on the need to foster a nascent knowledge economy, it is one which rests on the continued 
disadvantage associated with agency work. The agency working directive is to be welcomed, in that 
it will go some way to removing the inconsistent coverage of rights between agency and other 
workers. Provisions to ensure the equal treatment of agency and comparable workers may overcome 
the pay disadvantage associated with agency work. They will also provide a floor to agency work 
conditions that trade unions, despite some efforts, have so far been unable to achieve. This is 
important given that the largely low-skilled composition of agency work, the lack of improvements 
in transition rates over the 1990s and the failure of agency work to meet the preferences of many are 
a significant cause for concern in contemporary Britain.   
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  44Appendix 1: Characteristics of agency workers compared to other temporary and permanent 
workers in Britain, Spring 2000 
 









Sex        
Male 51.5  46.3  45.4  54.1 
Female 48.5  53.7  54.6  45.9 
        
Age       
16-24 36.3  20.0  45.8  14.4 
25-34 26.3  26.5  17.1  27.4 
35-44 17.2  26.5  17.0  26.7 
45-54 13.6  18.6  11.9  22.3 
55+ 6.6  8.5  8.5  9.2 
        
Dependent child        
Under 5  8.3  12.1  10.8  15.2 
5-18 17.0  30.9  23.1  30.3 
       
Married or living 
together  
47.5 62.4  43.2 68.7 
       
Region of usual residence       
North East  3.4  6.1  5.1  5.9 
Yorkshire 7.6  9.0  10.0  8.6 
East Anglia  3.2  4.6  3.0  3.9 
Midlands 19.3  11.6  14.9  16.6 
London 20.5  14.9  15.0  12.3 
South East  21.7  18.5  17.8  20.9 
South West  7.5  8.1  8.6  8.6 
North-West 7.0  10.9  10.5  11.0 
Wales 3.6  4.7  5.5  4.5 
Scotland 6.1  11.6  10.5  8.7 
       
Highest qualification       
Degree 17.2  39.2  13.0  17.0 
Higher degree  9.3  9.8  7.8  10.0 
A Level  27.0  18.3  23.5  24.6 
GCSE 22.4  15.9  30.3  23.6 
Other 17.8  11.6  11.6  13.8 
No qualification  6.4  5.3  13.7  11.1 
        
In full time education  6.5 7.9  31.8  3.7 
Not working 1 year ago  26.4 22.7  39.7 7.4 
        
(Appendix 1 continues overleaf) 
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Occupation      
Managerial (3.2)  6.7  3.0  16.1 
Professional 6.1  31.7  10.1  10.2 
Ass  Professional  7.3 13.9 5.9 10.1 
Clerical  41.1 15.5 12.1 16.0 
Craft (3.2)  5.2  7.0  10.3 
Personal and 
Protective 
9.8 14.0  23.0  11.5 
Sales (2.1)  3.2  14.2  8.9 
Plant and 
machinery 
19.5 5.2  7.6  9.2 
Other 7.7  4.7  17.3  7.6 
      
Tenure      
0--<3  months  36.2 15.7 23.4  4.2 
3-<6  21.0 12.9 26.2  4.5 
6-<12  19.6 23.1 20.8  9.2 
1-<  2  years  12.6 16.5 15.7 12.7 
2-<5 years  7.2  18.5  14.9  21.7 
5-<10 years  (1.9)  7.3  3.5  15.3 
10-<20 years  (1.4)  4  3.3  21.4 
20+  years (0.2)  1.94 2.2 11.1 
      
Total usual 
hours  
    
0-15 5.1  14.3  42.1  7.6 
> 15- 30  17.4  22.5  25.5  14.9 
>30-40  53.3 35.2 20.3 37.0 
>40-48 17.9  14  7.7  23.6 
>48  6.3 14 4.3  17.1 
      
Public sector  17.7 56.4 27.8 25.1 
Private sector  82.3 43.6 72.2 74.9 
      
N   253153  762546  537406  21665574 
Source: LFS, Spring 2000 weighted data 





                                                 
 
i The main goals of these regulations are to clarify the responsibilities of agencies and client firms with regard to health 
and safety issues and the provision of information, and to limit the circumstances in which agencies can levy a fee on 
client firms offering a permanent post to an agency worker (DTI 2002b). 
ii A recent case reflects the precarious legal position faced by agency workers. A cleaner placed by Brook Street to work 
for Wandsworth Council made a claim for unfair dismissal after being removed at the Council’s request on disciplinary 
grounds after four years employment.  Following an initially unsuccessful Tribunal decision, on appeal she was found 
to be an employee of Brook Street, on the grounds that the payment of wages, and the rights to exercise disciplinary 
functions and terminate her contracts were sufficient ‘control’ to render the agency the employer in this case (REC 
2004). However on application to the Court of Appeal, Brook Street successfully overturned the decision, the court 
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ruling that she was an employee of neither organisation, and stating that future cases involving agency workers should 
consider the possibility that an implied contract of employment has arisen between the employee and the client-firm. 
iii In March 2002, the draft Agency Working Directive defined a comparable worker as being ‘a worker in the user 
undertaking in an identical or similar job, taking into account seniority, qualifications and skills’ (European 
Commission 2002a : Article 3).  
iv Exemptions from the directive’s provisions for equal treatment are allowed where collective agreements exist, 
providing that an ‘adequate’ level of protection is retained and, in the case of pay, where temporary workers have an 
open-ended contract with the agency (and are paid between assignments)., 
v Although the removal of these restrictions is aimed at increasing the number of agencies, in many member states the 
market is dominated by large, often multi-national agencies with a five-firm concentration ratio as high as 80 per cent 
(Storrie 2002).  From the point of view of the larger agencies, increased regulation may be welcomed in that it will 
drive out further the smaller operators given the pressure on margins from these new measures. The UK market is 
unusually fragmented, but these regulations may hasten concentration of the sector. 
vi In the most recent discussions of the Directive at the EU employment and social policy council in June 2003, 
ministers failed to reach agreement on the content of the Directive. Discussion of the Directive will resume under the 
Dutch Presidency of the EU, from July 2004.   
vii Booth et al.’s (2002) focus is on fixed-term and casual work, however their arguments are sufficiently general to 
apply to agency workers. Similarly, Williamson’s (1985) transaction cost analysis predicts that the boundary between 
internalised, long-term employment relationships and market-mediated forms turns on the degree of firm-specific skill 
likely to be acquired on the job, and that where agency working is appropriate this will meet with workers’ preferences. 
Where agency jobs are used ‘neither workers nor firms have an efficiency interest in maintaining the association’ – 
firms can hire substitutes and workers are said to be able to ‘move to alternative employment without loss of productive 
value’ (Williamson, 1985: 242). However, this is to assume full employment. 
viii Doeringer and Piore (1971) accept that there will be a match between ‘secondary workers’ and ‘secondary jobs’ in 
some cases, but they point out that the problem for public policy arises because people are often consigned to secondary 
jobs, including agency work, due to discrimination not voluntary matching. 
ix Albert and Bradley hypothesise: ‘experts, aware of their market value and wanting more discretion over their work, 
will attempt to achieve this through the use of atypical employment arrangements which will often involve some form 
of agency system’ and further, ‘[w]e contend that temporary agency employment is an important sector of the expert 
employee labour market’ (1997: 5, 120).  
x Not only will these changes be confined to the highest skilled workers, but there is an expectation that they will 
spread: ‘it seems reasonable to suggest that as expert employment increases, the changes demanded by experts may 
raise the expectations of other employees and this, in turn, might motivate them to demand specific changes. Thus, a 
multiplier effect might occur across a relatively broad area of the economy and could lead to the adoption of expert 
employee type work relations’ (Albert and Bradley 1997 : 26). 
xi Five types of temporary work can be identified in the LFS: fixed-term contract work, seasonal work, agency 
employment, casual work and other temporary. In the analysis in this paper, seasonal, casual and other temporary work 
have been merged into a single ‘other’ category.  
xii Unless otherwise stated, all figures quoted are for employees of working age (i.e. 15-59/64) in Great Britain. We 
examine the period 1992-2000 due to a major reclassification of occupational groups from 2001. 
xiii Here there may be a link to the ‘new economy’ insofar as warehouse assistants and clerks are required to service the 
operation of internet shopping, but this is very different to that suggested in the literature. 
xiv Given their short duration and high turnover, all types of temporary job are over-represented in the stock of vacancies 
facing labour market entrants. On this basis, it is not surprising that temporary work is common among this group (see 
Gregg and Wadsworth 2000).  
xv Households remain in the LFS for five consecutive quarters and are interviewed each quarter.  Each dataset is made 
up of five approximately equal waves of 12,000 households. In each quarter, one wave will exit the survey after their 
last interview, and a new wave will enter their survey for their first interview. Questions on income are only asked to 
households in their first and final quarter interview. Thus in any one quarterly dataset, only a minority of respondents 
provide information on their income. Our pooling of four quarterly datasets, giving us income details for 59,317 
respondents, is in line with ONS guidelines and minimises the need to suppress results as cell sizes fall below 
recommended thresholds. 
xvi The remainder stated they were engaged in agency work for ‘other’, unspecified reasons. A probit model (not 
reported) suggests that the factors increasing the likelihood of stating ‘other’ reasons include being married, being 
female with a child aged 5-18 and having experienced redundancy in the last year.  
xvii Women with young children and women returners with young children each constitute a small proportion of the 
agency workforce (8 per cent each in Spring 2000).   
xviii If agency assignments are increasingly being used instead of probation contracts, we would expect that this rationale 
to become more important as labour markets tighten, as they did from 1996 onwards in Britain. We also tried variations 
on this particular split of our sample period, but the results are not sensitive to the precise date used. 
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